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COMMENTS
PASSAGE OF TITLE AND RISK OF LOSS UNDER
THE UCC AND LOUISIANA LAW
Louisiana, one of only three states1 which have not at this
writing adopted the Uniform Commercial Code, 2 is now sur-
rounded by UCC states. Since the UCC is under study by the
Louisiana State Law Institute, a comparison of article 2 of UCC
and present Louisiana law on the question of passage of title
and risk of loss in sales is timely.
LOUISIANA'S APPROACH TO TITLE AND RISK
The French theory of title and risk as embodied in the Code
Napoleon was conceived in reaction to and in a desire to avoid
the principles of Roman law on which prior French law was
based.3 Generally, under Roman legal theory, the contract of
sale formed only a personal engagement (obligation) between
the parties Which required delivery of the res in pursuance of
the contract to pass ownership. 4 Title passed only upon the ac-
complishment of this delivery or transfer of possession (known
as traditio).5 Though opposed by some jurists,6 Roman law
transferred risk to the purchaser as soon as the sale was per-
fected by an agreement of the parties as to object and price.7 As
a result, though the risk of loss was on the buyer, if the seller
failed to abide by the contract, the buyer had no right to de-
mand the thing and was relegated to an action in damages
against the seller.8 Though these Roman principles retained
their efficacy in the old French law, the rule requiring delivery
before ownership could pass was early circumvented through
such clauses as that of d6ssaisine-saisine by which the vendor
agreed to pass title via a fictional delivery and hold the goods
for his vendee.9 Therefore, when the drafters of the Code Na-
pol~on offered the precept that a sale was to be perfected and
1. Other states in which the UCC has not been adopted are Arizona and
Idaho.
2. Hereinafter referred to as UCC.
3. See 9 FENET, DiscuSsioNs 112-13 (1836) ; 2 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREA-
TisE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY TILE LOUISIANA STAT?, LAW INSTITUTE)
VII-VIII (1959).
4. 1 POIJIER, TREATISES ON CONRTACTS 200-01 (Cushing transl. 1839).
5. CODE 3.32.27; CODE 4.49.11; BUCKLAND, A MANUAL OF ROMAN PRIVATE
LAW 135-37 (1928) ; Comment, 6 Tu. L. REV. 272 (1932).
6. 1 POTILIER, TREATISES ON CONRTACTS 189 (Cashing transl. 1839).
7. Id. at 187; Williston, The Risk of Loss after an Executory Contract of
Sale in the Civil Law, 9 HARV. L. REV. 72 (1895) ; Comment, 6 TUL. L. REV.
272 (1932).
8. 1 POT-HIER, TREATISES ON CONTRACTS 201 (Cushing transl. 1839).
9. See 1 id. 196-98; Comment, 6 TUL. L. REV. 272, 275 n.18 (1932).
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title and risk were to pass upon consent of the parties to object
and price,10 they were not proposing a new principle, but were
continuing an established practice which gave fullest effect to
the will of the parties, recognizing the sale as a true consensual
contract, and thereby giving the buyer the real right of demand-
ing the thing sold itself. 1
The Civil Code adopting almost verbatim the French pro-
visions in the area, the Louisiana approach is that, absent con-
trary agreement, both ownership and risk pass to the vendee
upon perfection of the sale. This perfectiQn is accomplished
upon the concurrence of three things: consent of the parties,
specific identification of the object, and the fixing of a suffi-
ciently certain price.' 2
When there is doubt as to the specific identification of the
object, as when goods are identified only as being of a certain
kind or description, Louisiana courts have held that the object
becomes adequately determined to perfect the sale when there
has been an "appropriation" of the goods to the contract. Al-
though this is an obscure standard, the cases afford an indica-
tion of what particular acts will be sufficient. Separation of
the goods from a larger mass and delivery to the carrier for
shipment, 3 setting apart the goods in containers sealed by the
government and sending the buyer the individual identification
numbers of the containers, 14 and warehousing the goods sepa-
rated from the mass coupled with a delivery to the buyer of the
warehouse receipt,15 all have been held sufficient. It may thus
be concluded that there must be some act by the vendor isolating
the goods from a general mass which involves an element of
irrevocability, so that he no longer has complete control over
the destination of the goods.
The perfected sale requires a price that is certain,' meaning
that the parties must so bind themselves that the price, if not
10. FRENCH CIVIL CODE arts. 1138, 1583 (Wright's transl. 1908).
11. See annotations to article 1583 in 41 DALLOZ CODES ANNoTkS, NovEAu
CODE CIVIL 10-1 (1907); 9 FENEr, DiscUSSIONS 109-13 (1836).
12. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2456, 2464, 2467 (1870).
13. George D. Witt Shoe Co. v. J. A. Seegars & Co., 122 La. 145, 47 So. 444
(1908) ; State v. Shields, 110 La. 547, 34 So. 673 (1903).
14. Edgwood Co. v. Falkenhagan, 151 La. 1072, 92 So. 703 (1922).
15. Kessler & Co. v. Manhein, 114 La. 619, 38 So. 473 (1905).
16. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2464 (1870). For an interesting and detailed analy-
sis of Louisiana law as regards a sufficiently certain price necessary to perfect
a sale, see Hebert & Lazarus, Some Problems Regarding Price in the Louisiana
Law of Sales, 4 LA. L. REV. 378 (1942). It is important to note that under
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specifically fixed, may be determined without further action or
agreement on their part. 17 Consequently, if they agree that the
price is to be fixed by experts who refuse or fail to do so,"' or
if the parties stipulate that the settlement is to be agreed upon
at a later date, then fail to agree, 19 there is no sale. If the price
is a "good and valuable consideration, ' 20 or when the sale is
made "for about" 21 so much, the price is uncertain; but if it is
left to be fixed in accordance with market or wholesale price, 22
it is sufficiently definite.23 Inasmuch as both ownership and
risk pass to the buyer upon the perfection of the sale, regardless
of whether the price has been paid or the object delivered 24 Lou-
isiana law has in effect made the principle res perit domino a
part of its civilian system, passing title upon the consent of the
parties with risk following ownership as an incident and conse-
quence of it.
the UCC the parties, if they so intend, can complete a contract of sale though
the price is not settled. Section 2-305 provides that "in such a case the price
is a reasonable price at the time for delivery if (a) nothing is said as to price;
or (b) the price is left to be agreed by the parties and they fail to agree; or (c)
the price is to be fixed in terms of some agreed market or other standard as set or
recorded by a third person or agency and it is not so set or recorded." The sec-
tion further states that "when a price left to be fixed otherwise than by agree-
ment of the parties fails to he fixed through fault of one party the other may
at his option treat the contract as cancelled or himself fix a reasonable price."
Section 2-305 concludes by clearly stating that if "the parties intend not to be
bound unless the price be fixed or agreed and it is not fixed or agreed there is
no contract."
17. Louis Werner Sawmill Co. v. O'Shee, 111 La. 817, 35 So. 919 (1904).
18. Lake v. LeJeune, 226 La. 48, 74 So. 2d 899 (1954) ; Louis Werner Saw-
mill Co. v. O'Shee, 111 La. 817, 35 So. 919 (1904).
19. Clark Warehouse & Imp. Co. v. Jacques & Edmond Weil, 152 La. 707,
94 So. 326 (1922).
20. Conway v. Bordier, 6 La. 346 (1834).
21. Wright & Anderson v. Anthon, 17 La. App. 633, 136 So. 754 (1931).
22. Baucum & Kimball v. Garrett Mercantile Co., 188 La. 728, 178 So. 256
(1937).
23. In H. T. Cottam & Co. v. Moises, 149 La. 305, 307, 88 So. 916, 917
(1921); referring to a contract of sale in which no price whatsoever was men-
tioned, the court said (adopting the judgment of the court of appeal) : " 'I. It is
immaterial that no price was agreed upon. When goods are ordered from a mer-
chant without any stipulation as to price, he has a right to recover their market
value. Helluin v. Minor, 12 La. Ann. 124, 125; Morris, Tasker & Co. v. Fleming,
21 La. Ann. 411; Pehlan v. Wilson, 114 La. 823, 38 South. 570; Smith's Mer-
cantile Law, p. 613." The case apparently still stands for the proposition that
when a buyer agrees to purchase merchandise from a merchant and nothing is
said as to price, the court will find the market price therefor implied, despite
the fact that no cases have been discovered following the holding in this vein
and that the cases relied on as authority do not seem to support the statement.
Equity aside, it is difficult to distinguish such a situation from those in which
a vague statement as to price is made and the court has found the sale not
perfected 'because further action or agreement is required between the parties.
The UCC provides for the completion of a sale when nothing has been said as
to price in a similar manner. See note 16 supra, referring to section 2-305.
•24. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1909, 2456 (1870).
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THEORY OF TITLE AND RISK UNDER THE UCC
The UCC states that "the rights, obligations and remedies of
the seller, the buyer, purchasers or other third parties appl[y]
irrespective of title to the goods except where the provisions
[of the article on sales] refers to such title.' 25 Since only one
provision of the sales article refers to title26 - and that refer-
ence is insignificant- it may be said that title is of no prac-
tical consequence under the UCC. However, if the ultimate ques-
tion is location of title, as for example, when determining the
applicability of public regulation, the UCC provides rules based
on the theory that title passes to the buyer when the seller de-
livers the goods if he is to do so, or fulfills his obligation to the
buyer if he is not. Risk of loss is completely separated from the
passage of title under the UCC - unlike its predecessor, the
Uniform Sales Act, which embraced the concept res petit domino
with reverence27 - and is treated singularly as a charge to be
borne by the party in control of the goods, who can therefore be
expected to insure them. This basic theory presents a vastly
different approach from that embodied in present Louisiana
law:
"The legal consequences are stated as following directly from
the contract and action taken under it without resorting to
the idea of when property or title passed or was to pass as
being the determining factor. The purpose is to avoid mak-
ing practical issues between practical men turn upon the lo-
cation of an intangible something, the passing of which no
man can prove by evidence and to substitute for such ab-
stractions proof of words and actions of a tangible char-
acter."
28
Though title and risk under the UCC often pass simultaneously,
the reasons therefore are different, as noted above. No longer
25. Section 2-401.
26. Section 2-722 provides that if a third party deals with goods identified to
a contract of sale in a manner which causes actionable injury to a party to the
contract, the right of action against the third party is in any party to the con-
tract "who has title to or a security interest or a special property or an insurable
interest in the goods," as well as in the party who either bore the risk of loss
or has assumed it if the goods have been destroyed or converted. In such a con-
text title is of little consequence, as the title holder will usually fall under one
of the other categories which would make him eligible to bring an action against
the third party.
27. For an impassioned defense of the old common law rules and the institu-
tion of title against the concepts of the UCC, see Williston, The Law of Sales in
the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 63 HARV. L. REV. 561 (1950).
28. Comment, section 2-101.
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is the fine question of passage of title the decisive issue in as-
signing risk of loss, for under the UCC focus is on possession,
delivery, tender of delivery, and the agreement of the parties.
UCC COMPARED WITH LOUISIANA LAW ON PASSAGE OF TITLE
In the absence of explicit agreement stipulating when title
is to be transferred, the UCC provides that it shall pass "at the
time and place at which the seller completes his performance with
reference to the physical delivery of the goods, despite any res-
ervation of a security interest and even though a document of
title is to be delivered at a different time or place. ' 29 There-
fore, in a shipment contract not requiring delivery by the seller
at destination, title passes to the buyer upon delivery to the
carrier regardless of any reservation of a security interest
through the bill of lading,30 because it is then that the seller
has completed his performance with respect to physical delivery.
Similarly, if the shipment contract requires delivery at a par-
ticular destination, title passes at the destination when the goods
are properly tendered by the carrier to the buyer. 1 In Louisi-
ana, it is possible for title in goods that are to be shipped to
pass prior to delivery to the carrier if the sale has been per-
fected at that time, although the seller has not yet completed
his performance with respect to their physical delivery.3 2 If
perfection of the sale depends on the appropriation of goods
by surrender to a carrier who is to transport them under a
bill of lading, the applicable Louisiana law is the Uniform Bills
of Lading Act3 3 which provides that title is transferred accord-
ing to the form of the bill if the parties have not agreed other-
wise. If the shipment is consigned to the buyer, title passes
upon delivery to the carrier,34 but if consignment is to the seller,
he retains title to the goods. 5 In the latter case, the Act pro-
vides that "if, except for the form of the bill, the property
would have passed to the buyer on shipment of the goods, the
seller's property shall be deemed to be only for the purpose
of securing performance by the buyer, '36 indicating that all
29. Section 2-401(2).
30. Section 2-401 (2) (a).
31. Section 2-401(2)(b).
32. For example, if A contracted to sell, and B to buy, a single specific object
for a fixed price, ownershil) iii the object would pass to B Upon the completion
of the agreement, though A might be required to subsequently ship the object
to B.
33. LA. R.S. 45:940 (1950).





other attributes of ownership would pass to the buyer. Though
such a reading would produce results identical to those reached
under application of the UCC provisions, Louisiana courts have
not followed such an interpretation, holding that title remains
in the seller in such a situation. 7 Louisiana apparently is the
only state which has applied this uniform legislation in a non-
uniform way.3
If delivery is to be made without moving the goods, the UCC
provides that title passes upon delivery of the title document if
the seller is to do this. 39 In the absence of an express provision
between the parties to that effect, Louisiana law would pre-
sumably dictate a passage of ownership upon the perfection of
the sale although the seller has yet to deliver a document of
title. If no title document is to be delivered, title passes at the
time and place of contracting if the goods are identified at that
time within the meaning of the UCC.40 This provision is in es-
sence the same as Louisiana's existing law, although the require-
ments under the UCC for goods to be "identified" are not as
stringent as the previously discussed Louisiana concept of "ap-
propriation" because risk of loss and remedies of the parties do
not hinge on "identification."
Under the UCC "a rejection or other refusal by the buyer
to receive or retain the goods, whether or not justified, or a
justified revocation of acceptance revests title to the goods in
the seller. Such revesting occurs by operation of law and is not
a 'sale.' "41 This section will presumably be important in deter-
mining where title lies for the purposes of taxation and similar
matters. Louisiana law has no counterpart.
The unimportance of title under the UCC is clearly shown
by the section on third-party purchasers.4 2 Though the basic
common-law rule that a vendor with a voidable title can pass
a good title to a bona fide purchaser is retained4 3 it is further
provided that "any entrusting of possession of goods to a mer-
37. C. W. Greeson Co. v. Harnischfeger Corp., 231 La. 934, 93 So. 2d 221(1957). See also California Fruit Exchange v. John Meyer, Inc., 166 La. 9, 116
So. 575 (1928).
38. See BUGAN, WHEN DOES TITLE PASS 80-88 (2d ed. 1951).
39. Section 2-401(3) (a).
40. Section 2-401(3) (b).
41. Section 2-401(4).
42. Section 2-403.
43. Section 2-403 (1).
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chant"4 who deals in goods of that kind gives him power to
transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in ordinary
course45 of business."4 6
"'Entrusting' includes any delivery and any acquiescence in
retention of possession regardless of any condition expressed
between the parties to the delivery or acquiescence and re-
gardless of whether the procurement of the entrusting or
the possessor's disposition of the goods have been such as
to be larcenous under the criminal law. ' 47
This represents, to a degree, an adoption of the French doctrine
la possession vaut titre,48 which was rejected through omission
by the drafters of the Civil Code. The furthest that Louisiana
courts have heretofore been willing to go in the direction of
that doctrine is that an owner who clothes another with indicia
of ownership is estopped from demanding the thing when it has
passed into the hands of a bona fide purchaser, 49 though in one
case all that was apparently given' was bare possession to a
dealer in that particular type goods.50 The possibility of other
forms of estoppel also exists. 51 Of course, where credit is ex-
tended, although fraud on the part of the buyer is involved, the
latter obtains a voidable title and can therefore transfer a good
title to a bona fide purchaser.5 2 This somewhat muddled area
of our law would be cleared through an application of the UCC
rules.
44. Section2-104(1) defines "merchant" as "a person who deals in goods of
the kind or otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge or
skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction or to whom
such knowledge or skill may 'be attributed by his employment of an agent or
broker or other intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out as having
such knowledge or skill." The Comment notes that the definition is intended to
cover the professional vendor and not the casual, inexperienced seller.
45. Section 1-201(9) states that "'buyer in ordinary course of business'
means a person who in good faith and without knowledge that the sale to him
is in violation of the ownership rights or security interest of a third party in
the goods 'buys in ordinary course from a person in the business of selling goods
of that kind but does not include a pawnbroker."
46. Section 2-403(2).
47. Section 2-403 (3).
48. FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 2279 (Wright's transl. 1908). Goods lost or
stolen are excepted from the operation of this rule but it is doubtful that obtain-
ing by false pretenses would be included in such a category. See Jeffrey Motor
Co. v. Higgins, 230 La. 857, 89 So. 2d 369 (1956).
49. Flatte v. Nichols, 233 La. 171, 96 So. 2d 477 (1957) ; William Frantz &
Co. v. Fink, 125 La. 1014, 52 So. 131 (1910).
50. William Frantz & Co. v. Fink, 125 La. 1014, 52 So. 131 (1910).
51. See Lynn v. Lafitte, 177 So. 83 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1937). See also Packard
Florida Motors Co. v. Malone, 208 La. 1058, 24 So. 2d 75 (1945).
52. Flatte v. Nichols, 233 La. 171, 96 So. 2d 477 (1957) ; Trumbull Chevrolet
Sales Co. v. Maxwell, 142 So. 2d 805 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1962).
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UCC AND LOUISIANA LAW ON RISK OF Loss
General Rules
Risk of loss when there has been no breach of the sale con-
tract is covered by section 2-50953 of the UCC. In shipment
contracts, risk passes to the buyer upon proper delivery to the
carrier, unless the vendor is required to deliver the goods to a
particular destination, even if the seller purports to reserve
title or some possessory interest in the goods as a security
measure. 54  The rationale is that here the seller relinquishes
control of the goods and the buyer may reasonably be expected
to insure them from that point. The Comment to section 2-509
states that in order to have a proper delivery to the carrier,
the seller must contract with the carrier to meet "the require-
ments of the section on shipment by the seller,5 and the deliv-
ery must be made under circumstances which will enable the
seller to take any further steps necessary to a due tender."
However, if the delivery is to be made at a particular destina-
tion, risk passes when the goods are properly tendered to the
buyer by the carrier.56
53. Section 2-509 provides: "Risk of Loss in the Absence of Breach. (1)
Where the contract requires or authorizes the seller to ship the goods by carrier
(a) if it does not require him to deliver them at a paiticular destination, the
risk of loss passes to the buyei when the goods are duly delivered to the carrier
even though the shipment is under reservation (Section 2-505) ; but (b) if it
does require him to deliver them at a particular destination and the goods are
there duty tendered while in the possession of the carrier, the risk of loss passes
to the buyer when the goods are there duly so tendered as to enable the buyer
to take delivery.
"(2) Where the goods are held by a bailee to be delivered without being
moved, the risk of loss passes to the buyer (a) on his receipt of a negotiable
document of title covering the goods; or (b) on acknowledgment by the bailee of
the buyer's right to possession of the goods; or (c) after his receipt of a non-
negotiable document of title or other written direction to deliver, as provided in
subsection (4) (b) of Section 2-503.
"(3) In any case not within subsection (1) or (2), the risk of loss passes
to the buyer on his receipt of the goods if the seller is a merchant; otherwise
the risk passes to the buyer on tender of delivery.
"(4) The provisions of this section are subject to contrary agreement of the
parties and to the provisions of this Article on sale on approval (Section 2-327)
and on effect of breach on risk of loss (Section 2-510)."
54. Section 2-509(1) (a).
55. The section on shipment by the seller, section 2-504, provides that the
seller must (a) put the goods in the possession of such a carrier and make such
arrangements for their transportation as is reasonable, (b) promptly deliver or
tender to the buyer any documents necessary for the buyer to obtain possession
of the goods, and (c) promptly give the buyer notice of shipment. Failure by
the seller to meet the requirements of (a) or (c) is a ground for rejection only
if material delay or loss ensues.
56. Section 2-509(1) (b).
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Under Louisiana law, as with title, risk normally passes
upon perfection of the sale.57 Yet, it appears that if the seller
is to transport the thing sold to another place for delivery to
the buyer, title will not pass until he does so."8 If the Louisiana
sale involves a shipment under a bill of lading, the form of the
bill will control passage of risk under the Uniform Bills of Lad-
ing Act,59 whose provisions would produce results identical with
the UCC rules60 if properly construed. But, as we have seen,
our courts have so interpreted the Act that when the shipment
is made under a reservation in the bill, both title and risk re-
main in the seller in the absence of an express agreement to
the contrary.61
In a bailment situation under the UCC, where goods are held
by the bailee to be delivered to the vendee without being moved,
risk of loss shifts upon the buyer's receipt of a document of
title, 6 2 or upon the "acknowledgment by the bailee of the buy-
er's right to possession of the goods. ' 6 3 This produces results
substantially similar to those reached under present Louisiana
law, as such an act by the seller normally perfects the sale be-
cause it is an "appropriation" with an element of irrevocability.
But it would appear to be possible in Louisiana for the sale to
be perfected so as to transfer risk if the goods were sufficiently
identified prior to any giving of title documents, thereby put-
ting the buyer in the situation of bearing the risk of loss though
he could not immediately take possession of the goods.
57. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2467 (1870).
58. See Martin v. T. L. James & Co., 237 La. 633, 112 So. 2d 86 (1959), in
which the seller was to transport materials to specific destinations for delivery to
the buyer. Tile court held that title in the materials would not pass until the
buyer had completed delivery to the specified places, though it avoided the conse-
quences of this reasoning by finding on rehearing that a delivery was accom-
plished, neither restating nor renouncing the holding made on original hearing as
to when title would pass. See John M. Parker Co. v. E. Martin & Co., 148 La.
791, 88 So. 68 (1920), in which the seller shipped cotton to the buyer under a
Shipper's Order Notify bill. There, ignoring the Uniform Bills of Lading Act
(see note 36, supra, and the material referred to), the court held that title to
the cotton did not pass until it had reached its destination where it might be
delivered to the buyer.
59. LA. R.S. 45:940 (1950).
60. Section 2-509(1).
61. C. W. Greeson Co. v. Harnischfeger Corp., 231 La. 934, 93 So. 2d 221
(1957).
62. Section 2-509(2) (a). However, under section 2-503(4) (h) when a non-
negotiable document is tendered to the buyer the risk of loss will remain on the
seller during a reasonable time for presenting the document to the bailee and
securing his acknowledgment of the transfer.
63. Section 2-509(2) (b).
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In all other situations not involving breach of the sale con-
tract, risk under the UCC passes upon the buyer's receipt of
the goods if the seller is a merchant, 64 or upon tender of delivery
by the seller to the buyer if he is not.,5
"The underlying theory of this rule is that a merchant
who is to make physical delivery at his own place continues
meanwhile to control the goods and can be expected to in-
sure his interest in them. The buyer, on the other hand, has
no control of the goods and it is extremely unlikely that he
will carry insurance on goods not yet in his possession."' 6
This rule epitomizes the UCC philosophy on risk of loss, that
risk should rest on the party who has physical control of the
goods and can therefore be expected to insure them. Under Lou-
isiana law, of course, risk would pass immediately upon per-
fection of the sale, and would produce the result of a buyer
having risk of loss while his goods were still completely in the
control of his vendor. However, the Louisiana buyer is pro-
tected to an extent by the seller's obligation to guard sold but
undelivered goods as a faithful administrator or suffer any
loss occasioned by failure to do so.6 7 This duty requires reason-
able care,6 but does not include insuring the goods for the ac-
count of the buyer in the absence of specific instructions to
do so.0 9
Breach of Contract
In cases of breach of the contract of sale, UCC section
2-5107" controls. If the breach results from failure of tender
or delivery to conform to all conditions of the agreement, risk
64. See note 44 supra.
65. Section 2-509(3).
66. Comment 1, section 2-509.
67. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2468 (1870).
68. Delahoussaye v. Adeline Sugar-Factory Co., 50 La. Ann. 544, 23 So. 619
(1898) ; Fearn, Putnam & Co. v. Richardson, 12 La. Ann. 752 (1857) ; Penning-
ton Grocery Co. v. Schmidt & Zeigler, 5 La. App. 434 (1927).
69. Hanan & Richards Co. v. Bowles, 25 La. Ann. 453 (1873) ; Acme Burlap
Bag Co. v. Hardin Bag Co., 1 La. App. 379 (1925).
70. Section 2-510 states: "Effect of Breach on Risk of Loss. (1) Where a
tender or delivery of goods so fails to conform to the contract as to give a right
of rejection the risk of their loss remains on the seller until cure or acceptance.
(2) Where the buyer rightfully revokes acceptance he may to the extent of any
deficiency in his effective insurance coverage treat the risk of loss as having
rested on the seller from the beginning. (3) Where the buyer as to conforming
goods already identified to the contract for sale repudiates or is otherwise in
breach before risk of their loss has passed to him, the seller may to the extent
of any deficiency in his effective insurance coverage treat the risk of loss as
resting on the buyer for a commercially reasonable time."
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will remain on the seller until the defect is cured 71 or the buyer
accepts the goods. 72 Apparently the burden of establishing con-
formity of the goods is borne by the seller until they are ac-
cepted, after which the buyer must prove any non-conformity
alleged. 75  This rule is a logical application of the basic UCC
theory on risk: since the seller will have control over the goods
until the defect is cured or the buyer accepts the goods, he must
bear the risk. Louisiana law is substantially the same, as a
seller who is in default 74 with respect to delivery or compliance
at the time required in the contract has the risk of loss from
the time of default.7 But this rule is qualified by the fact that
if destruction of the goods would have been equally certain had
delivery been accomplished, the buyer must nevertheless suffer
the loss. 7 6 No Louisiana cases have been discovered when the
question of passage of risk or title was involved where non-con-
forming goods were delivered. Presumably, if the vendor
breached the contract by failing to deliver the kind of goods
required or stipulated, risk of loss would remain with him ;77
whereas if the goods delivered were subject merely to a redhibi-
tory defect, risk would shift to the vendee.7 1 The UCC further
provides that where there has been a breach, and the party
damaged is the one upon whom the risk of loss falls, then if
the goods should become injured or destroyed, that party may
treat any portion of the loss uncovered by his own insurance
as resting on the wrongdoer.7 9 But if it is the buyer who
71. According to the Comment to section 2-510, this term contemplates "situa-
tions in which the seller makes changes in goods already tendered, such as repair,
partial substitution, sorting out from an improper mixture and the like since
'cure' by repossession and new tender has no effect on the risk of loss of the goods
originally tendered."
72. Section 2-510(1).
73. This conclusion is reached by the wording of section 2-607(4): "The
burden is on the buyer to establish any breach with respect to the goods accepted."
Evidently, until acceptance the burden will therefore rest on the seller.
74. The term is used here to mean either a delaying of the giving of posses-
sion, or as defined in article 1911, which provides three ways that a debtor may
be put in default: (1) by the contract's providing that a party's failure to
comply with its terms puts him in default; (2) by the other party's demanding
performance via a suit, a writing, a protest by a notary, or a verbal requisition
before two witnesses; and (3) by the law in cases where a breach of the contract
alone is declared a default.
75. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1910, 2470 (1870).
76. Id. art. 2470.
77. In this situation presumably title and risk would not pass because of the
absence of an "appropriation" by the seller of the kind of thing the vendee had
consented to purchase.
78. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2533 (1870). Here risk apparently falls on the
buyer for the reason that in such a case the contract is subject to avoidance
by him.
79. Section2-510(2) and (3).
1967]
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
breaches the contract before passage of risk to him, the seller
can treat risk as resting on the buyer to the extent of any defi-
cient insurance coverage only for a "commercially reasonable
time."80 Louisiana, of course, has no such provision, saying
simply that if the buyer delays obtaining possession he must
bear the risk except where the thing sold is damaged through
the gross.neglect of the seller in failing to care for the thing.8 '
Sale Under a Suspensive Condition
There are certain situations arising in the Civil Code which
might, under different sets of circumstances, fall under any of
several UCC provisions regarding risk and title. The first of
these is the sale made under a suspensive condition, including
the buyer's reservation of the right of view and trial,8 2 in which
ownership and risk do not pass until the condition is fulfilled.88
The cases 84 under articles 2044, 2457, 2460, and 2471, dealing
with such sales, have reached results similar to those which
would be reached under the UCC: risk of loss and title to the
goods do not pass until fulfillment of the condition. But when
the condition merely involves an inspection of the goods by the
buyer, UCC section 2-513(4)85 provides that such an inspection
does not affect the passage of title or the shifting of risk un-
less there is an express agreement to that effect. For the most
part, Louisiana jurisprudence holds that title and risk do not
pass until acceptance when an inspection is contemplated. 86 The
UCC rule does present problems. For example, a buyer whose
goods sent f.o.b. shipping point have been destroyed will find
difficulty in proving they were non-conforming goods. But the
buyer can always protect himself through an express agreement
concerning risk prior to inspection.
80. Section 2-510(3).
81. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2469 (1870).
82. Id. art. 2460.
83. Id. art. 2471.
84. Jackson Motors v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 239 La. 921, 120 So. 2d 478(1960) Wampler v. Wampler, 239 La. 315, 118 So. 2d 423 (1960) ; De La
Vergne Co. v. New Orleans & Western R.R., 51 La. Ann. 1733, 26 So. 455(1899) Jochams v. Ong, 45 La. Ann. 1289, 14 So. 247 (1893); Burton v.
Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co., 152 So. 2d 235 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963) ; Hamilton
Co. v. Medical Arts Bldg. Co., 17 La. App. 508, 135 So. 94 (1931).
85. Section 2-513(4) provides that the "place or method of inspection fixed
by the parties is presumed to be exclusive but unless otherwise expressly agreed
it does not postpone identification or shift the place for delivery or for passing
the risk of loss."
86. American Creosote Works v. Boland Mach. & Mfg. Co., 213 La. 834, 35
So. 2d 749 (1948) ; California Fruit Exchange v. John Meyer, Inc., 166 La. 9,
116 So. 575 (1928). But see Brown-McReynolds Lumber Co. v. Commonwealth
Bonding & Cas. Co., 11 Orl. App. 49 (La. App. 1913).
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Sale by Weight, Tale, or Measure
Where a sale of goods is by weight, tale, or measure under
Civil Code article 2458, risk remains on the seller until the
goods are weighed, counted, or measured,8 7 unless there is ex-
press agreement to the contrary.88 The question of when title
passes in such a sale has gone almost unconsidered, although
two early cases 89 which have not been overruled held that title
passes upon the completion of the agreement, prior to the
weighing, counting, or measuring, and dicta in at least two
other cases" support that finding. The contrary position, that
title does not pass until the act of weighing, counting, or meas-
uring, also has support in one decision, however.9 1 It is submit-
ted that the very wording of article 2458, that such a sale is
"not perfect, inasmuch as the things so sold are at the risk of
the seller, until they be weighed, counted or measured, ' '92 means
that except for transfer of risk the sale is perfect upon comple-
tion of the agreement with respect to all other incidents of own-
ership, including title. The Court of Cassation clearly recog-
nized that this was the intent of the article and pointed out
that article 1585 of the Code Napoleon (Louisiana Civil Code
article 2458) makes a sale by weight, tale or measure imper-
fect only in the sense that the risk remains on the vendor until
the act of weighing, counting, or measuring, and that the buyer
can demand delivery 93 of the thing sold. The court stated that
87. Kohler v. Huth Constr. Co., 168 La. 827, 123 So. 588 (1929); Milliken
& Farnwell v. American Sugar Refining Co., 143 La. 667, 79 So. 214 (1918);
Goodwyn v. Pritchard, 10 La. Ann. 249 (1855) ; Fearn, Donegan & Co. v. Maltby
& Co., 9 La. Ann. 8 (1854).
88. Kelham & Co. v. Carroll, Hoy & Co., 20 La. Ann. 111 (1868) ; Clark &
Thieneman v. Norwood, 19 La. Ann. 116 (1867).
89. Shuff v. Morgan, 9 Mart.(O.S.) 592 (La. 1821), directly held that article
2458 called for a splitting of the incidents of ownership. Its reasoning was fol-
lowed in Davenport v. Adler, 52 La. Ann. 263, 26 So. 836 (1899). The question
was even later raised in Lee Lumber v. Hotard, 122 La. 850, 48 So. 286 (1909),
but there the court waived any decision thereon, and based their conclusion on
other grounds.
90. Louisiana State Rice Milling Co. v. McCowan, 180 La. 174, 156 So. 213
(1934) ; Cook v. West, 3 Rob. 331 (La. 1842).
91. See Lambeth v. Wells, 12 Rob. 51 (La. 1845) ; Comment, 5 LA. L. REV.
293 (1943).
92. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2458 (1870).
93. Discussions upon presentation of the draft of the Code Napoleon show
that the article was stated in its final form to make it clear that the buyer would
have the right to demand delivery of the goods, a real right based on ownership.
When the draft was submitted, the tribunal observed as is reportcd in 9 FENET,
DIscussIoNs 85 (1836) : "This article, as it is proposed in the projet, may give
rise to great difficulty. It may be concluded that, in the case stated, there is no
sale; so that the buyer does not have the right to force the vendor to perform
his engagement. However, the obligation exists and the vendor may always be
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"far from derogating from the general principle established by
article 1583 (Louisiana article 2456, which makes the sale per-
fect upon the consent of the parties as to thing and price),"
article 1585 makes the sale perfect in all respects other than
risk.9 4 No such problem would exist under the UCC since title
and risk are not linked, and the buyer, rather than taking risk
immediately upon weighing, counting, or measuring, would be
responsible only when the seller no longer has control of the
goods or has at least made a tender of delivery. It would be
possible for title to pass prior to the act of weighing, counting,
or measuring if the goods were at that time identified to the
contract. Under Louisiana law, however, if the parties clearly
express their intention that the object of a sale, an undetermined
part of a determined whole, come from that particular whole
and from no other, and the whole is lost or destroyed by in-
evitable accident, the loss will fall on the buyer.95 The result
under the UCC would be different since the vendor has com-
plete control of the goods in such a situation and risk would
therefore not have passed to the buyer.
Lump Sale
Where goods are sold in a lump, article 2459 provides that
the sale is perfect though the goods "may not have been weighed,
counted, or measured." 9 The courts have interpreted this arti-
cle to apply only to a sale for a lump price.97 For example, a
sale of all the one-inch pipe located in kilns for a fixed total (or
lump) price was held complete despite the fact that the amount
of pipe actually contained proved to be less than estimated.9 8
In such a situation, title and risk pass immediately to the buyer
upon perfection of the agreement. Under the UCC, of course,
this would not be the case. Title might pass at that time if no
documents of title were to be given and no shipment by the
seller was required. But risk would not pass until the seller
required either to deliver the thing sold, or, if he may not do it, pay damages."
See note 100 infra.
94. See the opinion of the Court of Cassation, Arr~t du 11 Novembre, 1812,
Sirey 1813, part 1, p. 52, as quoted in D. Kelham & Co. v. Carroll, Hoy & Co.,
20 La. Ann. 111 (1868).
95. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1916, 1917 (1870). See Warren & Crawford v.
Kirk, 24 La. Ann. 150 (1872).
96. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2459 (1870).
97. Peterkin v. Martin, 30 La. Ann. 894 (1878) ; Rhea v. Otto, 19 La. Ann.
123 (1867).
98. Mobile Mach. & Supply Co. v. York Oilfield Salvage Co., 171 So. 872
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1937).
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relinquished control of the goods or made a tender of delivery,
depending on the circumstances, under section 2-509. Until
that time the seller's possession and control would preclude
the likelihood that the buyer would have insured the goods.
CONCLUSION
The advantages of the UCC provisions stem mainly from
their sound, commercially-oriented practice of divorcing passage
of title from the shifting of the risk of loss, and in placing the
risk on the party who is, or should be, in control of the goods,
and who, under modern business practices, may be expected to
carry insurance on them. The result - a far cry from the
maxim res perit domino which previously pervaded the common
law and is still firmly entrenched in the Civil Code - interest-
ingly represents a return to the old Roman practice of dealing
with title and risk separately, though the effects and the reasons
are quite different. Although the French, in treating sale as a
consensual contract the perfection of which does not depend on
delivery, generally placed risk of loss from the time of perfec-
tion on the buyer, it appears that they recognized an exception
in the case of sales by weight, tale, or measure. And as noted
previously, article 2458, taken almost verbatim from the Code
Napoleon, 99 supports a splitting of the incidents of ownership
by its very wording. 100 This exception founded in the French
law was directly adopted in early decisions' 0 ' of the Louisiana
courts. The Uniform Bills of Lading Act, in force in Louisiana,
clearly states that if only the form of the bill prevents title
from passing to the buyer upon shipment, the seller's continu-
99. FRENCIH CIVIL CODE art. 1585 (Wright's transl. 1908).
100. That the drafters of the original article in the Code Napoleon intended
it to provide for a splitting of the incidents of ownership is shown in the observa-
tions of the tribunal when the draft was submitted. In 9 FENET, DIscusSIONS
85 (1836), the report of the tribunal reads (transl. by J. Denson Smith) : "The
only effect that the stated circumstance (i.e., the weighing, counting, or meas-
uring) should produce is that, the sale not being accomplished, although it exists,
the risks that the thing sold are exposed to, in this particular case, are at the
charge of the seller until the weighing, counting, or measuring." If the sale
"exists" though it -has not been "accomplished" by a final determination and
the giving of possession, and the thing is "sold," then can the conclusion be any
other than that ownership has passed to the buyer while the seller retains pos-
session much in the nature of a security interest and bears the risk because he
is still in control of the goods? This conclusion is supported by the fact the
article was made to provide, and the tribunal further observed, that in such a
case the buyer has the real right of demanding the goods. Such a right, it is
submitted, would not attach were not the buyer meant to be vested with owner-
ship.
101. See note 89 supra.
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ing property interest in the goods is only for the purpose of
securing performance. 1 2 This should lead to the conclusion
that risk falls on the buyer during shipment despite the seller's
reservation of a security interest through, for example, a "Ship-
per's Order Notify" bill. But the courts have avoided such a
conclusion. As said in C. W. Greeson Co. v. Harnischfeger
Corp. :108
"Prompted by a reluctance to countenance any sort of split-
ting of the incidents of ownership, our courts have construed
this provision to mean that, where goods delivered f.o.b. to
a carrier are consigned to the vendor, risk of loss remains
in said vendor during transit unless there is an express
agreement between the parties that the risk is to be assumed
by the vendee upon delivery to the carrier."
The contrary, and it is submitted, the proper, interpretation
generally prevails in common-law jurisdictions, the usual state-
ment being that title and risk both pass to the buyer despite
the shipper's reservation which gives the vendor a special prop-
erty in the goods to secure payment from the buyer, thereby
withholding possession from the buyer. 0 4
If in the French sources of Louisiana law, in the Civil Code
itself, and in an even later expression of the legislative will,
the Uniform Bills of Lading Act, there exists a basis for split-
ting the incidents of ownership in certain situations, Louisiana
should not be reluctant to accept that theory as embodied in the
UCC regarding risk and title. Such an approach seems to be
more just and practically adapted to modern business customs,
and the clearly-worded rules of the UCC might well prove far
easier to apply than the often ambiguous and difficult juris-
prudential tests which now surround transfer of risk and title
under Louisiana law.
CHARLES S. WEEMS, JR.
102. LA. R.S. 45:940(2) (1950).
103. 231 La. 934, 949, 93 So. 2d 221, 226 (1957).
104. Alderman Bros. Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 92 Conn. 419, 103
Atl. 267 (1918) ; Maffei v. Ginocehio, 299 Ill. 254, 132 N.E. 518 (1921) ; Stand-
ard Casing Co. v. California Casing Co., 233 N.Y. 413, 135 N.E. 834 (1922)"
Sawyer v. Dean, 114 N.Y. 469, 21 N.E. 1012 (1889).
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